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 Varieties of Capitalism:  Production and Market Relations 
in the USA and Japan 
 
Suzanne J. Konzelmann 
 
 
During the 1980s, Japan’s macroeconomic strength encouraged widespread interest in 
the competitive advantages associated with its organization-oriented micro-level 
institutions.  However, with Japan’s more recent macro-economic difficulties and 
prolonged stagnation, and in the light of America’s relative success, pressure for 
institutional reform in the direction of the American model is mounting.  
Liberalization of trade and capital movements has contributed to increasing economic 
inter-dependence and integration of the world’s advanced nations.  Customers and 
investors in Japan and the US alike are demanding that firms be increasingly 
responsive to changes in technologies and market requirements and that they deliver 
consistently high quality products and services at low price.  At the same time, the 
increase in foreign equity investment in Japan means that, like their American 
counterparts, Japanese firms are being urged to prioritise shareholder interests, deliver 
continuous improvement in short term financial results and be transparent in their 
reporting.  However, despite very similar pressures to those faced by American firms, 
Japan is evolving incrementally and developing a hybrid system that continues to 
maintain its emphasis on a resource-based approach to productive system 
effectiveness and organizational competitiveness.   
 
Focusing on the contrasting cases of Japan and the US, The Embedded Corporation: 
Corporate Governance and Employment Relations in Japan and the United States 
describes developments in corporate governance and human resource management 
(HRM), analysing the influence of globalization, shifts in macro-economic 
performance and declining union strength on employment practices, the strategic role 
of HRM and the professional status of the HR executive in this context.  Traditionally, 
Japanese firms have been what Jacoby describes as ‘organisation oriented’ while 
American firms have been more ‘market oriented.’  This is reflected in the dominant 
features of their respective systems of corporate governance and work organization, 
where despite movement towards the American model, the Japanese system of 
stakeholder-orientated corporate governance and its view of labour as a productive 
resource continues to stand in sharp contrast to the American shareholder-based 
system of corporate governance and view that labour is a factor of production with a 
cost to be minimised.  An important finding is that companies in both America and 
Japan are moving towards the market pole of the organization – market continuum.  
But differences in the rate of change and reluctance to abandon micro-level 
institutions and practices that have been considered sources of competitive advantage 
have contributed to the persistence of significant differences in corporate governance 
and employment relations across the two countries.   
 
These developments have important implications for national systems of corporate 
governance and employment relations.  Yet explaining them depends upon an 
understanding of the productive function of HRM, which itself requires an analytical 
framework that is grounded in a theory of production.  The starting point for this 
essay, therefore, is an analysis of ‘productive systems,’ the strategic role of HRM 
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 within them and the requirements for its effectiveness.  In this respect, HRM 
represents the management of the organization of work, the effectiveness of which is 
importantly determined by its role in production.  HRM and corporate governance are 
dynamically interrelated in the sense that while HRM serves to structure internal 
productive system relationships, corporate governance brings together and structures 
relationships among internal and external stakeholders.  The essay next examines the 
logic of production and the challenges firms face in an environmental context such as 
that in the US, where the logic of markets is prioritized.  In Japanese capitalism, by 
contrast, the logic of production is prioritized and markets serve as the arena in which 
productive system effectiveness is realised.  The case of Ferodyn,1 a Japanese-
American joint venture located in the United States, is used to illustrate both the 
competitive advantages derived from the Japanese production-oriented approach and 
the difficulties associated with operating in the American market-oriented system of 
corporate governance.  The essay concludes by arguing that whilst it is difficult to 
identify the degree to which micro-level institutions contribute to macro-level 
performance, the Japanese and American systems of corporate governance and 
employment relations – and within them, the role of the HR department and executive 
– are likely to continue to diverge because of differences in the role and relative 
importance they assign to market and production relationships. 
 
Productive Systems: HRM and corporate governance 
The importance of a theory of production in explaining the relationship between 
labour management and corporate governance derives from the fact that the purpose 
of HRM is the effective deployment of labour in production; and this depends upon an 
understanding of the logic of production, the essentially complementary relationship 
between labour and the means of production, and the central importance of 
cooperation in productive system relationships.2  The centrality of cooperation in 
production and the mutuality of stakeholder interests in organisational effectiveness, 
however, do not imply that all interests are shared.  Inevitable and legitimate conflicts 
of interest arise with regard to distribution of jointly created value, in a system where 
relationships are characterized by differences in relative power.  But mutual 
dependence in production relationships means that no-one is without power and the 
failure to effectively resolve conflicts of interest has the potential to undermine 
performance by setting off a retaliatory withdrawal of cooperation on the part of the 
relatively disadvantaged group.  An important objective of HRM is therefore to 
organize and manage labour resources in such a way as to secure the maximum level 
of cooperation in production and thereby achieve the operational and dynamic 
efficiencies that follow from this;  HRM also has a role to play in establishing 
mechanisms for finding acceptable solutions to differences in stakeholder interests.  
 
With growing recognition of the increasing returns generated by cooperation in 
production and greater worker involvement in the planning and execution of work, as 
well as by worker self-regulation and a more democratic style of management, HRM 
has become a significant component of organizational strategy.  In this, central 
importance is assigned to commitment to the objectives of the organization, which is 
seen to generate competitive advantages that benefit both the organization and its 
stakeholder groups (Guest 1987).  However, the ability of managers to commit 
themselves to employees in such a way as to secure the productive objectives of 
HRM, depends upon the extent to which they are required to prioritise the interests of 
others than their workforce and other internal stakeholders; and this will be 
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 importantly determined by corporate governance (Deakin et. al. 2002).  By 
designating a dominant stakeholder group and prioritizing interests accordingly, 
corporate governance conditions managerial commitments on the requirements of that 
group.  Corporate governance also has an influence on the dominant view of human 
resources (employee stakeholders).  In American-style publicly traded firms, for 
example, the shareholder is the dominant stakeholder.  Hence, the employment and 
income security of employees and other internal stakeholders (such as suppliers) is 
conditional on the achievement of continual improvement in shareholder value, the 
pursuit of which may be in direct opposition to these longer-term interests.  Because 
shareholders tend to be less committed to the organisation than they are to the value 
of the shares they hold, their relationship with internal stakeholders is a relatively 
detached one.  In this context, human resources are likely to be viewed as a cost to be 
minimized or a productive resource to be exploited.  By contrast, in firms where 
shareholder interests do not dominate or where they are tempered by recognition of 
longer-term, shared interests in organizational viability, employees are more likely to 
be considered a productive resource and source of competitive advantage.  In this 
respect, therefore, corporate governance has an influence on the degree of reciprocity 
in commitments, which in turn will determine the effectiveness of HRM in achieving 
its ultimate productive objectives.   
 
Resource-based firms in the U.S. and Japan: The conflicting logic of markets and 
production 
 
Many studies find that cooperative, team-based workplace techniques generate 
substantive productivity and quality gains as well as financial results that are equal or 
superior to those associated with more traditional work systems.3  However, as 
Jacoby acknowledges, ‘The conundrum is that, despite the productivity advantages of 
these practices, they remain relatively uncommon in the US’ (p. 160).  Even those 
firms that succeed in planning and implementing cooperative work systems have 
found that sustaining them over the longer term is difficult.  To date, studies suggest 
that diffusion of these practices is slower and less extensive than one would expect, 
and the medium and long-run survival of even the most promising new workplace 
techniques is far from guaranteed.4  The difficulties experienced by resource-based 
firms in the US bear this out and can be traced to the inherent conflict between the 
human resource orientation of the work system and the neoliberal-market logic that 
dominates American law and economic policy, business practice and corporate 
governance.   
 
This conflict has its origins in the structuring of the American environment by 
historical developments in the theory and practice of markets and organisation.5  
These are rooted in the liberal economic conceptualisation of individuals as inherently 
self-interested, and the assumption that behaviour is best mediated by the market in 
order to ensure both individual and general economic welfare as well as to deliver 
distributional justice. The significance of market competition is that it is credited with 
releasing the creative self-interest of individuals while at the same time constraining 
its misuse.  The market is also seen as rewarding success by selecting out 
organisations by virtue of their success and allowing them to grow to market 
dominance. Such arguments as these shaped the development of economic theory and 
legal practice in the US, which subsequently shifted the right to self-determination 
from individuals to the management of large corporations.  This move was warranted 
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 by what Berk (1997) described as ‘corporate liberalism’, from which perspective 
managerial control of large firms is justified by the beneficial effect it is believed to 
have on economic progress.  It is reinforced in employment relations, where 
managerial prerogative is considered the necessary means for enforcing workers’ 
compliance with contractual promise.  Thus, while liberal economic theory is 
generally suspicious of cooperation and collective organisation, such as trade unions 
and employers’ organisations, it justifies market and hierarchical control in business 
on the grounds that it is the outcome of competitive success and efficient markets.  
More recently, this logic has been extended to the stock market, which is assumed to 
operate as an efficient market for corporate control in which shareholders, by means 
of the hostile takeover, ensure managerial efficiency (Deakin & Slinger 1997).   
 
In a parallel development, theories of labour management diverge from the idea of the 
efficacy of hierarchical control.  The first stage in this process was the emergence of 
scientific management, by which scientific laws of production – if properly applied by 
management – were believed to both maximise productive efficiency and resolve the 
mutual antagonism between managers and workers. Scientific management’s failure 
in this latter respect gave rise to the human relations school.  Initially concerned with 
identifying the physiological and social needs of workers and using this knowledge to 
improve the performance of Taylorist forms of work organisation, further 
development in human relations led to the realisation that involving workers in the 
planning and execution of work as part of group activity improved their socio-
psychological well-being and released their creativity.  The idea that human relations 
is a productive factor was a stimulant for the development of HRM.  Thus, in the 
evolution of theory and practice in labour management, the role of management has 
been redefined from authoritarian initiator, organiser and director of work to 
democratic ‘facilitator’ of a participatory, cooperative and self-regulating system; at 
the same time, workers have been re-conceptualised as full partners in co-operative 
production, rather than factors of production to be coerced into compliance with 
managerial interpretation of their contractual commitment.  This shift in the respective 
roles of management and workers has been accompanied by a re-characterisation of 
the workplace from ‘pluralistic,’ where interests of the two sides are viewed as 
separate and potentially conflictual, to ‘unitary,’ where interests are considered to be 
in common. 
 
Theoretical developments in liberal economics and production management, upon 
which American business practice and policy have been based, therefore diverge in 
their conclusions regarding authority and power in productive enterprise. Liberal 
economics justifies the increasing centralisation of entrepreneurial power and 
authority on the grounds that it is justified by market success; and challenging it risks 
slowing economic progress.  Management theory, on the other hand, while not 
challenging the authority of management, argues for an increasing decentralisation of 
responsibility for production.  This gives rise to a fundamental conflict between the 
logic of markets as an efficient mechanism for allocating resources, promoting 
entrepreneurship and distributing income and the logic of production management as 
a process for effectively combining and exploiting productive forces.  In American 
capitalism, this contradiction has been assumed away by supposition that the market 
is an efficient co-ordinating mechanism and by the notion that management can even-
handedly work in the interest all of the organisation's stakeholders.  However, its 
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 impact can be seen in the enormous challenges faced by American resource-based 
firms. 
 
In contrast to the American emphasis on competition in free markets, and despite the 
marketisation of certain aspects of corporate governance and employment relations, 
the central focus of the Japanese variety of capitalism continues to be production.  In 
Japanese firms, the emphasis is on co-operation and the decentralization of 
responsibility and control in production.  Collective action supercedes individual 
action.  Contracts tend to be relational rather than arms length and continuity instead 
of discontinuity characterizes productive relationships.  Micro-level institutions 
provide support for such things as information flows, knowledge transfer and 
collective learning processes by which new product and process technologies are 
developed and diffused.  They also serve to establish the rules, norms, standards of 
business behaviour and trust that are required for building long-term relationships.  As 
evident in Jacoby’s research, even in the more market-oriented of the Japanese firms 
he studied, this emphasis on the requirements of production was apparent.  For 
example, rates of turnover were low, core employees were provided lifetime 
employment, substantial expenditures were made in firm specific training, employees’ 
welfare was considered a responsibility of the firm, and in the event of layoffs, 
companies provided retraining in an effort to limit the negative consequences for 
those affected.  In these firms, the HR department played a central role, was 
stakeholder orientated and maintained a high level of status within the executive ranks 
(pp. 54-7; 76-7).   
 
Regardless of the degree of cooperation on the supply side, however, Japanese firms 
are highly competitive in product markets; and market success plays an important role 
in the dynamics of the national productive system.  This is evident in the strength of 
Japan’s industrial sector, which despite general macro-economic stagnation, has 
contributed to the country’s persistent and substantial trade surplus.  But these are not 
the idealised markets of American liberal ideology that function to co-ordinate 
production and to evolve superior productive forms.  Rather, these markets are outlets 
for productive activity where competitiveness depends upon setting the pace in the 
effective co-ordination of production and innovative activity, and in creating as well 
as responding to customer demand.  Markets and production relations are therefore 
complementary and iterate in a dynamic process that generates pressure for 
responsiveness and change in both markets and firms.  Because the logic of 
production is not subordinated to that of free markets, the Japanese system delivers 
consistently high quality and productivity in tandem with high road employment 
relations, thereby serving the long-term interests of all of the system’s stakeholder 
groups.  In this context, the central importance of HRM in facilitating the dual 
achievement of production and market requirements serves to elevate and reinforce 
both the position of HRM within the firm’s strategic approach and the professional 
status of the HR executive. 
 
The competitive advantages associated with Japan’s production-oriented approach are 
not confined to its domestic export sector, however.  Despite the inherent hostility of 
the American variety of capitalism to a resource-based approach, evidence of the 
productive advantages associated Japanese capitalism can also be found in the market 
success of Japanese ‘transplants’ located in the United States.  One such example is 
Ferodyn, a Japanese-American joint venture. 
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Japanese resource-based firms in the U.S.:  The case of Ferodyn6
The Ferodyn joint venture was established as a separate and autonomous entity within 
a traditional American steel corporation.  It was built in the rural American Midwest, 
100 miles away from its American parent, to produce exceptionally high quality 
finished steel coils for customers in the automobile, appliance and office furniture 
industries.  Within the plant and between the plant and corporation, reporting 
relationships were direct: Ferodyn’s HR Director reported to the plant President, who 
was a corporate executive, reporting directly to the corporation’s President and CEO.  
Ferodyn’s technology and work system were modeled on the Japanese system where 
teamwork, shared responsibility and broadly defined jobs characterized the 
organization of work; job ladders were flat, promotion was based on training, 
knowledge and skill and the expectation is that all employees would become fully 
qualified.  To promote employee commitment, bargaining unit employees were 
guaranteed employment security and pay was high by local and industry standards.   
 
After reaching steady-state operating levels, the Ferodyn productive system was 
highly effective, reinforcing plant-level strategies and behaviours.  It set world 
records for efficiency and product quality; and employee performance bonuses were 
high.  Employee turnover and grievances were virtually non-existent and employees 
overwhelmingly agreed that it was a good place to work.  The Ferodyn work system 
also attracted the attention teams of researchers who identified it as an outstanding 
example of a high performance work system.  
 
However, despite these outward appearances, Ferodyn was vulnerable to changes in 
its internal and external environment.  Although jointly-owned by an American and 
Japanese parent, Ferodyn was a subsidiary of the American parent, subject to 
corporate decisions that might not be in the plant’s best interest; and the effectiveness 
of top management in protecting the plant from corporate and union pressures proved 
to be short-lived because of its dependence on personalities. When these individuals 
retired, the plant was left without strong leadership protection and support, reducing 
Ferodyn’s relative position and security within the corporation and making it 
susceptible to changing managerial and union attitudes regarding its work system.  As 
a result, with these retirements and the changes that followed, the plant became 
embedded in the corporation’s more traditional managerial ethos and structure, which 
was less accommodating of the Japanese resource-based approach upon which it was 
founded. 
  
Ferodyn was also vulnerable to decisions made by its American parent regarding the 
structure of corporate ownership. Although clearly profitable, and one of the largest 
American steel producers at the time, market pressures were steadily eroding not only 
steel prices but also the value of steel companies’ stock.  As a result, and under 
pressure from institutional investors, in a quickly negotiated buy-out, Ferodyn’s 
American parent sold itself (and its share in the joint venture) to a global steel holding 
company whose low cost strategy is incompatible with the requirements of a 
production-oriented work system and of the customer mix that Ferodyn was created to 
serve.  Following the take-over, one third of Ferodyn’s managerial workforce was 
removed without warning and control was centralized within the corporation. 
Employee authority in many areas of production-related decision-making was 
eliminated, regular training ceased; scheduled maintenance was suspended and the 
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 flow of information stopped. In addition, key plant management personnel who had 
been leaders under the earlier regime were removed, either voluntarily or through 
forced retirement. Together, these actions have severely damaged the institutional 
framework upon which Ferodyn’s co-operative work system was built; the work 
system is rapidly deteriorating into a more traditional form and performance is 
suffering. 
   
The Ferodyn case provides a powerful illustration of the feasibility of successfully 
replicating a Japanese production-oriented system in the American market-oriented 
environment and of the product market advantages that can be generated.  However, 
American joint-ownership by a publicly-traded steel corporation subjected it to stock 
market pressures which were in opposition to Ferodyn’s system of production.  Were 
it not made subject to the requirements of the American market-based system of 
corporate governance, Ferodyn is likely to be a much stronger plant today.7   
 
Conclusions 
To an important degree, HRM operates as a system of internal governance of the 
stakeholders involved in production.  Systems of corporate governance bring these 
relationships together with those of the firm’s other stakeholder groups in such a way 
as to either prioritise the interests of particular groups or provide mechanisms that 
serve to balance competing interests.  Because of the central importance of 
cooperation in production for competitiveness in markets, in a system where 
relationships in both production and markets are characterized by mutual and 
conflicting interests and differences in relative power, the ability to create ways by 
which legitimate differences in stakeholder interests can be resolved is a source of 
competitive advantage.  This capability will determine not only the effectiveness of 
HRM and a resource-based approach in meeting the objectives of the organization and 
the requirements of production but also the capacity of the organization for 
responding to the demands of the markets in which it operates.  In this important 
respect, the Japanese are both production-oriented and market-oriented because the 
effectiveness of their production-orientation is reflected in the market success of 
Japanese companies, whether they be domestic exporters or transplants. 
 
The current interest on the part of American firms in strategic HRM and a resource-
based approach suggests recognition of the productive potential of HRM and of the 
contribution that employees and HRM can make to organizational effectiveness.  
However, the free market orientation of the American national productive system, 
particularly in the area of corporate governance, makes it very difficult to sustain 
these approaches because of the conflicting requirements of production and free 
markets and of the prioritization of markets in this context.  At the same time, the 
macro-economic strength of the U.S. and the market power of American business are 
fueling interest in further marketisation of corporate governance and employment 
relations.  Whilst it is difficult to determine the extent to which aggregate 
performance is derived from micro-level institutions and dynamics, in both the U.S. 
and Japan, independent of production, there are macro-economic conditions that have 
contributed to differences in relative performance.  In the U.S., for example, the 
enormous level of household and government debt serves as a stimulus for effective 
demand; while in Japan, the high rate of savings does quite the opposite.  
Nevertheless, despite the Japan’s current macro-economic difficulties, the market 
strength of its production-oriented industrial system is manifest in Japan’s substantial, 
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 uninterrupted trade surplus, which compares favourably with America’s persistent 
deficit.8
 
In both the U.S. and Japan, hybrid systems of corporate governance and employment 
relations are evolving as evident in the marketisation of certain parts of the Japanese 
system and the resource-based approach taken by some firms in the American system.  
Yet both systems are moving towards the market pole of the organization – market 
continuum at a rate that is serving to increase rather than reduce the distance between 
these two varieties of capitalism.  In the American case, the dominance of the belief in 
free markets impedes the effective use of HRM to galvanise production.  By contrast, 
despite marketisation of certain aspects of its systems of corporate governance and 
employment relations, Japan is retaining much of what is required for productive 
system effectiveness; and the sharpening of market forces may in fact be operating as 
a stimulant to its long-term competitive advantage.   
 
The irony is that the American market-oriented system is based on belief in the 
market as the optimal coordinating mechanism for production; yet the superior market 
performance of the production-oriented Japanese transplants reveals the crucial role 
played by a production-orientation in determining market effectiveness.  What this 
suggests is that the ‘market-orientation,’ characteristic of the American variety of 
capitalism is something quite different from an emphasis on what is required for 
successful market performance.  In this regard, comparative analysis of the American 
market-based and Japanese institution-based varieties of capitalism offers valuable 
insight into alternative approaches to organizing and managing production and market 
relationships and their impact on performance of both the corporate and the national 
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Notes 
 
1 Ferodyn is a fictitious name. 
2 For a discussion of the concept of productive systems see Wilkinson (2002 and 1983), Birecree, 
Konzelmann and Wilkinson (1997). 
3 See, for example, Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson and Straus 1996; 
Huselid 1995; Baker 1999.   
4 See, for example, Kochan and Rubinstein 2000, Konzelmann 2003, Konzelmann, Forrant and 
Wilkinson 2004. 
5 The ideas embodied in this section are further elaborated in an extremely valuable work by Wilkinson 
2002; and Forrant and Wilkinson 2004. 
6 For a further development of this case, see Konzelmann, Forrant and Wilkinson 2004 and 
Konzelmann 2003. 
7 The comparative success of fully-owned Japanese automobile transplants in the U.S., and their 
effectiveness in replicating the quality of the Japanese production-oriented system within their 
American supply-chain, suggests that it is possible to emulate the effectiveness of this system in the 
U.S., but only so long as the requirements of production are not subordinated to those of markets, 
like the stock market, that are both unrelated to and destructive of the system of production. 
8 Since 1985, Japan’s trade surplus on goods has fluctuated between $69 and $131 billion, measuring 
$106 billion in 2003; this compares with a US trade deficit of between $111 and $549 billion, 
measuring $549 billion in 2003. 
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